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In UnPopulist, Cathy Young offers valuable research on Vladimir Putin’s admirers on the political right in America:
[B]yshalt opposition to aid to Ukraine does not necessarily mean for Vladimir Putin. . . Pro-Putin themes are becoming more prevalent on the right. At this point, pro-Putinism is no longer an undercurrent in right-wing rhetoric: it is superficial.
But not all pro-Putin conservatives are created equal. For some, their hatred of the American left outweighs any emotion they have toward Putin. Others are more ideological: they oppose the Western liberal task itself. Untangling those other tensions is key to explaining why so many other right-wing people are adopting perspectives that, until recently, would have earned them the label of Kremlin cronies from other conservatives. . .
[Tucker] Carlson reflects the dominant mode of the Trumpist right: if not actively pro-Putin, at least anti-Putin. The anti-anti-Putin would conceivably admit that Putin is bad, but they would only insist that other things are far worse: the Mexican drug cartels, the progressive philanthropist George Soros, “the left,” or the U. S. “ruling class. “Like the old left-wing Soviet apologists, they invent fake political prisoners in the United States to recommend an ethical equivalence with the Kremlin dictatorship. . . .
It’s nothing new that many right-wing Americans see Putin’s Russia as the antithesis of Western “awakening. “This is especially true when it comes to sexual and gender norms: I noticed the beginnings of this trend in 2013, when several right-wing political wing teams and conservative pundits praised a Russian law censoring “propaganda” about homosexuality. Discussing the phenomenon recently in the context of the Republican Party’s anti-Ukrainian turn, David French cited examples such as far-right strategist Steve Bannon’s praise for Putin’s “anti-Ukrainian” attitude. It “woke up” Russia’s conservative gender personality and politics, or psychologist Jordan Peterson’s suggestion that Russia’s war in Ukraine is part of a self-defense opposed to the decadence of the “pathological West. “
The concept of Russia as a bulwark opposed to traditionalism and “anti-awakening” resistance is a symbol that Putin’s regime intentionally cultivates, not only to appeal to the prejudices of its own population, but also to make friends among Western conservatives. they allow themselves to be seduced by an affinity that goes beyond anti-anti-Putinism. . .
However, the distaste for post-1960 social and sexual liberalism does not completely erase the right’s love for Putin. Some pro-Putin right-wing discourses point to a much more radical rejection of liberalism, even in its most classical forms (the liberalism of John Locke and John Stuart Mill. . . . ) . . . .
[Christopher] Caldwell, who brazenly hails Putin as “a hero to populist conservatives,” similarly and brazenly acknowledges that the “hero” suppressed “peaceful protests” and jailed and likely murdered political opponents. Still, he argues that “if we were to use classical measures to perceive leaders, involving border defense and national flourishing, Putin would count as the most outstanding statesman of our time. “Dubious claims about Russia’s “flourishing” under Putin aside, what is most telling about this defense is that it blatantly invokes norms that predate and rejects Enlightenment-based fashionable ideals of freedom, self-government, and human rights.
Young aptly compares Putin’s right-wing American supporters to former left-wing Western admirers of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes. Both teams feel a strong enough affinity with a foreign dictatorship to forget or deny horrific atrocities, which in Putin’s case are accompanied by either large-scale internal repression and horrific atrocities in Ukraine, comparable to those committed through Hamas in opposition to Israel, but on a much larger scale.
Interestingly, as Young points out, one of Putin’s right-wing American supporters even adopts the analogy of communism:
Caldwell praises Putin’s refusal to settle for “a subordinate role in a U. S. -led global formula constructed through foreign politicians and business leaders,” and offers a striking analogy:
“Populist conservatives see [Putin] the same way progressives once saw Fidel Castro, as the one who says he will not submit to the world around him. You don’t have to be a communist to appreciate the way Castro is behaving, regardless of his position. He was in the process of creating an area of autonomy for his country.
If pro-Putin “populist conservatives” are the equivalent of Cold War-era pro-Castro progressives, it’s a no-brainer and a self-revelation.
I commented on Western Putin enthusiasts (including Europeans and Americans) in this video, which is part of Marshall University’s podcast series on the Russia-Ukraine war:
If I disagree with Young, it’s because I give more importance to the nationalist detail in the Western right’s affinity for Putin. I believe that, for many, this is more vital than social conservatism and cultural grievances. American social conservatives, who are also not very nationalistic, tend to be much less sympathetic to Putin and some strongly supportive of Ukraine who oppose him. Examples come with former Vice President Mike Pence and Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell.
But these two resources of pro-Putin attitudes are linked, and their relative importance varies from case to case.
Young also devotes a segment of his article to Tucker Carlson, one of Putin’s leading supporters on the American right. I have discussed here some of their mistakes related to Russia.
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Ilya Somin is a professor of law at George Mason University and Free to Move: In-Person Voting, Migration and Political Freedom, and Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter.