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The most intellectually honest answer to the question of who will succeed Xi Jinping as China’s paramount leader is simply, “We don’t know.”
Xi’s succession is the ultimate “known unknown” in Chinese politics. We don’t know when Xi will leave office. We don’t know how Xi will leave office. We don’t know if Xi will be a political heir. It’s not even transparent how a successor would be selected if Xi doesn’t appoint one.
This opacity is worrying. China is arguably the second toughest country in the world. Xi’s role as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gives him a central role in economic, diplomatic, and military decisions that affect the entire world.
Would a new leader settle for or reject Xi’s legacy? Governments and businesses around the global have a stake in his replacement’s personal tastes on political control, marketplace reform, U. S. -China relations, and territorial ambition relating to Taiwan and the South China Sea. But it is tricky to speculate on the long run of those problems without having some concept of the nature of Xi’s departure or how his successor would be chosen.
Still, the absence of clear foresight does not mean we should just throw up our hands and not think about Xi’s succession. Peering into a future largely devoid of information makes it even more important to identify and evaluate the evidence that does exist.
That evidence doesn’t tell us what will happen to Xi’s succession, but it does allow us to make educated guesses about what might happen. The evidence includes Xi’s political habits during his first 11 years in office, the history of succession politics within the CCP and other Leninist government parties, as well as a handful of Party-state regulations.
This evidence leads to three conjectures: First, Xi is unlikely to name a successor, or at least not a strong one, well in advance. Second, the final final results of Xi’s succession are unlikely to be orderly or predictable, due to conflicting political networks and manipulable Party regulations. Third, the political outcomes of Xi’s succession will depend on China’s scenario when he leaves office; there will most likely be some continuity regardless of Xi’s performance.
There are many tactics to get Xi out of office, such as voluntary resignation, elite rebellion, a military coup, or sudden illness, with huge possibilities for variation in the scenario. Richard McGregor and Jude Blanchette discuss various probabilities in their article After Xi: Future Scenarios for Leadership Succession in Post-Xi Jinping Era.
Xi will likely rule China until he “goes to meet Marx,” as the saying goes. Xi had acquired enough power to ignore the nascent precedent saying he should indicate a successor at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The next year, he amended the state constitution to remove term limits on his concurrent role as head of state, allowing him to rule for life as president as well as head of the Party and the military. In 2022, at age 69, Xi ignored previous norms that said leaders aged 68 or older should retire from the Politburo.
Xi is unlikely to voluntarily appoint a successor, let alone hand over power, in the near future. This could weaken his authority, exacerbate divisions within his network of supporters, and in the end, threaten his political legacy and his political legacy. public safety. And right now, Xi’s strength — especially his centralization of personnel, ideology, security services, and military — makes it very difficult for any rival to organize against him, even if his policies become unpopular.
Elite rebellion is not impossible. Research conducted by Milan Svolik shows that two-thirds of deposed authoritarians fall to inside challengers. Yuhua Wang finds that almost 60% of Chinese emperors who did not exit office by natural death were murdered, deposed, forced to abdicate, or forced to commit suicide by regime elites. A conceivable trigger for Xi would be an economic depression or military misadventure, or if he began purging his closest allies.
Naming a successor could undermine Xi’s authority. Once Xi announces the next paramount leader, he could become a lame duck as the political elite begin to softly cultivate ties with and take more political cues from the successor. Even if that person did nothing but follow Xi’s orders, there would effectively be more than one power center in the Party. The successor would also provide a focal point that would make it somewhat less difficult for Party insiders to rally against Xi’s leadership in any moment of crisis.
The election of a successor may also weaken Xi’s political support. Xi will most likely choose a close political best friend to advance his political project. But that selection would mean not opting for others, which could alienate overlooked top lieutenants. empowering lower-ranking officials with close ties to the designated heir, while disempowering those without. Such fractures may weaken Xi’s ability to mobilize the Party elite to carry out his decisions. If Xi attempted to triumph over this challenge by nominating him as an outside candidate, all of his close allies could feel vulnerable and, combined, could undermine the successor and, by extension, Xi himself.
Finally, handing power to a successor could threaten Xi’s legacy. Xi could retain formidable informal influence after retirement, but he appears to prefer the security of formal office, having worked assiduously to institutionalize the powers of the general secretary and ban the informal “old person” politics practiced by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Leaving office would also render Xi vulnerable to the hidden preferences and political talents of his successor (indeed, few glimpsed Xi’s true colors before he became leader and began displaying the extent of his personal ambition and political skill). His anti-corruption campaign and ideological crackdowns have made him many enemies, and Xi may fear for his freedom and safety, or at least for the longevity of his policy priorities. More fundamentally, Xi seems to see himself as a man of destiny, a true believer in the Party’s mission of national rejuvenation and his own ability to achieve that goal. One look at U.S. politics is enough to see that politicians everywhere have egos and like to stick around.
But there are reasons for Xi to have a plan, or several plans. . .
We can’t see into Xi’s mind, and any succession plan that currently exists would be one of his most closely guarded political secrets. In his perfect book Party of One: The Rise of Xi Jinping and China’s Superforce Future, Chun Han Wong presents the ultimate and compelling counterargument that orderly succession is the order of the day. Wong argues that “Xi’s ability to establish an elegant succession may determine whether his vision of a rejuvenated China will outlive him. ” If Xi can name a strong successor who continues his political agenda and protects his family, he can avoid a struggle of forces that threatens to divide the Party, damage the country, and undermine Xi’s legacy. Actually, Xi would like to do it, but the political value may simply be prohibitive.
Party history offers little precedent that would appeal to Xi in this regard. Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in part to attack his heir apparent, Liu Shaoqi, for undermining Maoist economic policy. Lin Biao, the next designated successor, died in a plane crash as he attempted to flee Beijing after his son hatched a plot to assassinate Mao. Deng Xiaoping purged his first two protégés, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, for wavering in their commitment to Party dominance, and then he had to force Jiang Zemin to re-embrace economic reform with his 1992 “Southern Tour.” And Xi must surely see how Jiang’s support for his own rise ended up severely curtailing Jiang’s political influence.
The obstacles defined above will likely dissuade Xi from naming a replacement in the near future, even at the expense of his long-term legacy. The most likely precedent for Xi’s succession would be that of Mao in Hua Guofeng. After Lin Biao’s death in 1971, Mao considered Wang Hongwen as his successor, but replaced his brain and finally called Hua Guofeng five months before his death in September 1976. Hua emerged from relative obscurity but remained the ideal leader for just two years until Deng thwarted him. (although both sought to revise Maoist policies. )
This story highlights another puzzling variable in succession forecasts: Xi may also simply change his mind, perhaps even repeatedly, about whether and who he will name a successor. As Xi ages, he will likely and most likely increasingly tame his political heirs. He would have to delegate more responsibilities to his subordinates. But the mere allusion to Xi’s withdrawal would be a seismic surprise to elite politics, and the reaction of supposed allies and adversaries would influence his thinking. If they feel uncomfortable or threatened, they would possibly cancel their appointments. Similarly, even if a successor is chosen, if Xi comes to doubt his loyalty or competence, this appointment may not last.
Xi’s successor is unlikely to be as powerful, regardless of how the succession plays out. The later a successor is named before Xi’s departure, the weaker he is likely to be. If Xi names a successor, other networks of Xi supporters are likely to fight for the most sensible job.
Much of this uncertainty stems from the lack of transparent succession mechanisms within the Party. Mao exploited Hua, Deng overthrew Hua, Deng augmented Jiang, Deng anointed Hu, and then Jiang supported Xi. It’s behind-the-scenes politics over and over again.
The variety of Xi as Hu’s heir, obvious after the 17th Party Congress in 2007, allegedly contributed to his victory over Li Keqiang in an informal vote among senior officials. But Xi ended the vote within the party after 2012 in favor of opting for new leadership formations through talks. with the elite.
If Xi chooses a successor, he will most likely stick to an orchestrated but rigorous variety procedure to bolster the legitimacy of the selected cadre. It can also enshrine this selection in authoritative Party documents and require other leaders to claim their consent, making it more difficult (or at least more embarrassing) for the successor to refuse.
If Xi suffers a sudden incident in his physical condition, there is no way to know what will happen next. Article 23 of the Party Constitution simply states that the general secretary is elected by a plenum of the Central Committee and will have to be elected from among the ranks. of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). Xi’s successor will probably, though not necessarily, be an existing member of the PSC, since a plenum can technically simply load up a new member and then appoint that user as general secretary.
But how can the Central Committee even convene a plenary session without a general secretary? The Party Statutes stipulate that the Politburo is guilty of convening plenary sessions, but it is the General Secretary who is guilty of convening the Politburo. This legal conundrum lays bare the importance of casual force in determining political outcomes in Beijing.
History can be a future. . .
The account of the transition from Mao to Hua and then to Deng is Joseph Torigian’s e-book Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion, whose name details the three key points that matter in succession struggles in Leninist one-party regimes.
First, the importance of prestige means that victory often depends more on interpersonal authority than policy differences or economic interests. If we apply this theory to the case study of Xi’s succession, we can examine the different networks that connect senior leaders below Xi.
Two possible rival cadres of Xi loyalists appear to be emerging. The first is a group of officials related to Fujian province who knew Xi when he was local leader there from 1985 to 2002 or worked with him there afterward, including Xi’s staff leader Cai Qi and the new economic czar. He Lifeng. Se an organization of officials with similar ties in Zhejiang province, where Xi was leader from 2002 to 2007. The leader of this organization is Li Qiang, who as premier directs the work of ministries to the State Council. Yet we know little about the private relationships between the most sensible leaders or whether those network paintings could simply be coherent without Xi. And the longer Xi’s reign lasts, the more his former affiliates will withdraw from the prestige of “Party elders” and compete for post-Xi political influence with the emerging “seventh generation” leaders born in the 1970s.
Second, victory depends on coercion. That is, gain control of the army, police, intelligence services, and other security-related ministries to secure succession. For Xi’s succession, we might take a look at which Xiers networks seem well-positioned to take over China’s centers. of coercive power.
It can simply be argued that Fujian’s network is primed to deploy coercion. It will most likely include senior security official Chen Wenqing and Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong, as well as newly appointed Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), He Weidong. Cai Qi’s mandate includes the Central Guard Bureau, which is responsible for the security of Party leaders. Chen Yixin, Minister of State Security and a close colleague of Xi and Li Qiang in Zhejiang, may only emerge as an intermediary for rival forces.
The third key factor, manipulation, means that victory depends more on skill for variety procedure than on betting on an explained “selection. “However, while regulations can be circumvented or even ignored, the appearance of legality, legitimacy, and stskill is still important.
If Xi were to depart suddenly, who could best manipulate the process of selection? The situation would be extremely fluid, but a case can be made that Cai Qi — or someone in his position in the future — would play a role. Cai has an unusually central role in managing internal Party affairs as a PSC member who leads both the Central Secretariat and the General Office of the Central Committee. He would likely be the first senior leader to learn of any developments regarding Xi’s health or decision-making.
The Party Statutes generate the legal conundrum discussed above, however, Article 23 also establishes the Central Secretariat as the governing body of the Politburo. In the absence of a general secretary, Cai could argue for a benevolent interpretation of this article that would allow the Central Secretariat Assembly to convene a Politburo meeting that would then convene a plenary session.
An aspiring leader would not need universality to achieve this. According to Article 25 of the Working Rules of the Central Committee (which the General Directorate has the power to interpret), only a majority of the members of the Politburo will be required to hold office. a meeting. Thus, thirteen members of the Politburo can simply convene a plenum. Article 24 stipulates that a majority of the members of the Central Committee must then be convened in order to hold a plenum. That’s 103 members. Only a fraction of those members have to make a decision. Thus, according to Party rules, it would theoretically require only 52 members of the Central Committee to appoint a new general secretary. (This minimum requirement assumes that the 52 members of the Central Committee The Central Committee comes with thirteen members of the Politburo. )
However, implementing such a plan would require much more, adding control of the propaganda system, by the army and security services, and rivals too weak or disorganized to challenge the measure. Moreover, any new leader would prefer to come by force with the façade of unanimity within the Party.
Another wild card could simply be the vice president. Article 84 of the state charter states that if the presidency becomes vacant, then the vice president becomes president. Although the largely ceremonial presidency is by far the least vital of Xi’s three main functions, the new incumbent would have statutory powers to enact laws, appoint heads of state, grant special pardons, call for a state of emergency, and even call for war orders and factor mobilization.
However, the constitution says that the president exercises these powers “pursuant to decisions of the National People’s Congress and the National People’s Congress Standing Committee [NPCSC].” Still, an accidental president could still try to affect the succession process by blocking government action. If they collaborated with a powerful NPCSC chairman, they could use lawfare, new appointments, or emergency decrees to gain more leverage.
These thought-provoking exercises, however, are concrete forecasts and are especially valuable in illustrating the uncertainty and unpredictability of succession politics within the Party, especially on the occasion of a sudden succession crisis or an attempt to remove an appointed but unpopular successor.
The history of succession politics in China sheds light on speculations of the third primary related to Xi’s succession. This history suggests that the Party is more likely to follow Xi’s political timeline if China is on a positive trajectory when he leaves office, and more so likely to deviate from Xi’s legacy if China faces significant difficulties.
For example, a strong elite and popular replacement emerged after Mao’s death in 1976, in a society traumatized by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the crisis of the Great Leap Forward. Hua Guofeng and then Deng Xiaoping embraced policy relaxation and economic reform.
Similarly, when Xi succeeded Hu in 2012, there was widespread social discontent due to weak leadership, widespread corruption, and lax regulation, and Party members were alarmed by the disunity evident in the Bo Xilai scandal. Undoubtedly, a climate of crisis has helped Xi consolidate his power. strength.
It is impossible to say what China will look like by the time Xi’s successor is determined. While pessimism is rising, and the country’s growth trajectory will notably underperform its world-beating past, it is far from certain that China is destined for crisis or even for stagnation.
What he is less likely to replace after Xi is the continuation of the CCP regime. The officials around Xi, whether they like it or not, have a vested interest in perpetuating the formula that has explained their lives and careers. Even the Cultural Revolution failed. Of course, Xi’s departure would open a window for social protests, but the Party could still deploy its internal security forces to suppress dissent.
A successor will owe a lot to Xi. They may simply draw on Xi’s legacy to bolster their own legitimacy, at least initially, which would require continued reverence for Xi Jinping Thought even when it is repurposed to advance other political goals, just as Deng did with the legacy. of Mao.
A successor is unlikely to enjoy Xi’s same concentration of political authority, which would mean more power sharing, perhaps among different networks of Xi supporters. This could create a somewhat looser ideological environment with more room for policy debates and more decentralized governance. In that environment, Chinese society could become somewhat more open and tolerant.
One attractive focus that leads some analysts to take a more positive view of China’s long-term politics is the generational shift: Long-term leaders would likely have other values and govern differently. Research by Wei Shan and Juan Chen shows that young Chinese are more individualistic, more willing to express themselves, and less likely to conform to authority figures. But they are also less likely to prefer democracy as a form of government, most likely because of propaganda, patriotic education, and the developing political disorder in many democracies. But fundamentally, the Examination of Generations cannot fully explain how a person will react to his or her time. Many other people believe that Xi’s personal traumas during the Cultural Revolution and his professional reporting during the era of reshaping and opening up would make him a relatively liberal leader. They were wrong.
Economic policy is more fertile ground for anyone wishing to depart from Xi’s legacy. Even senior policymakers today know that China’s economy is facing unprecedented challenges, and Xi’s preferences for security and control are affecting its performance.
After Xi, an elite consensus may eventually emerge around a turnaround in the economy and a more market-oriented, more potent policy orientation for the personal sector, greater openness to foreign companies, and new approaches, such as stimulus packages for households.
Foreign policy is less likely to change than economic policy. U.S.-China strategic competition increasingly resembles something like a new Cold War, wherein both Beijing and Washington view competition with the other as a foreign policy priority. This strategic dynamic would make it politically and practically difficult for any new leader to engineer a structural rapprochement with the United States, although they may pursue détente while Beijing seeks to address domestic challenges (like the path that Xi is currently pursuing with the United States).
However, a new leader might also feel the need for a show of force to bolster his political prestige and outmaneuver the military. Torigian shows how Deng achieved this by invading Vietnam in 1979; Xi arguably did something similar in leading China’s reaction to the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis in late 2012.
Xi’s succession is aimed at precipitating an excessive situation such as an invasion or blockade of Taiwan. But it raises the option of actions by the Chinese military, such as incursions into the Sino-Indian border, recapture of islands in the South China Sea, or major military exercises around Taiwan.
Predicting the long term is difficult. Foreign Policy published an article in 2017 claiming that Xi had already selected his successor: Chen Min’er. Seven years later, Chen is even a member of the CPS. Likewise, there is little chance that the exact procedure and procedure can be guessed. final results of China’s next succession.
But research into the history, regulations, and design of Chinese policy suggests that we would possibly have a greater degree of confidence in some broader projections. Xi is unlikely to name a successor in the near future, and he may never reach an agreement. A sustainable plan. Whether there is a plan or not, the process will most likely be influenced by private rivalries, political machinations, and the security apparatus. Policy adjustments will depend on China’s situation at the time.
And Xi is likely to rule for a long time. He would be 84 years old at the 23rd Party Congress in 2037. If Joe Biden wins the US presidential election in 2024, he would be 86 years old at the end of his second term. Deng was 87 years old when he embarked on his historic excursion. of the South in 1992.
What would be the most likely effect if Xi ruled well for life?Politics would gradually become less stable, as other leaders maneuvered with each other in the event of a sudden succession crisis. -public and volatile. Most likely, the policy will continue to emphasize national security, adopt state-sponsored responses to economic problems, and play a strategic competitive role with the United States and its allies and partners.
This assessment sounds bleak, but we will also have to keep in mind the option of change. Julian Gewirtz has written about the desire to avoid “historical determinism” about China’s future. The uncertainties highlighted here underscore the risks of assuming that China will be what it is today.
After all, history is driven by a mix of individual leaders, institutional structures, economic constraints, social pressures, and foreign relations, all of which interact in tactics that are fundamentally dynamic and difficult to predict. Xi’s legacy can survive with a few minor changes. Or China may simply revel in even greater militarism, instability, and repression under the leadership of its next leader. But it is also conceivable that a new general secretary will push the Party towards a more tolerant policy and more open markets.
Although a wide variety of succession scenarios are possible, one thing is clear: they all have enormous geopolitical implications. Given what is at stake, and despite the many uncertainties, it is more imperative than ever to monitor and benchmark Xi’s succession.
This article is adapted from an invited keynote address delivered by the author on September 26, 2023, at the inaugural Global Conference on New Sinology hosted by the Organisation for Research on China and Asia in New Delhi, India. A shorter summary of the address can be found in the GCNS Conference Report 2023. The author would like to thank Dominic Chiu, Christopher Johnson, Joseph Torigian, Chun Han Wong, and Guoguang Wu for their valuable comments and feedback. Any errors and conjectures remain the author’s own.