Expecting debauchery 3 days before payday, Crane, at the time platoon leader and battery officer, tried in vain to convince the commander to cancel the inspection, but he refused.
“The Air Force’s anti-drug dogs had so many alerts in the first 3 rooms that they exhausted their olfactory nerves, and the Air Force had to prevent them,” says Crane, a retired Army lieutenant. column. and head of former facilities and the U. S. Army War College. USA
Because the dogs lost their sense of smell, Crane says the Air Force tried to sue its battery to retrieve the dogs’ charge, and Crane may do virtually nothing to get rid of his drug-addicted infantrymen — that deport them, he said. Like the rest of the country, the military also faced race relations issues at the time, as well as deep resentment, even anger, among many enlisted infantrymen in the officer corps, Crane says.
“It’s hard to get rid of the bad apples, and there were so many bad apples,” Crane says.
The Vietnam War had just ended. The task was complete and no one had committed to joining the army, even as the Cold War continued, with the risk of nuclear war with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the army leadership healed his wounds and returned to what he was. he knew: tanks and planes.
As the war in Afghanistan ends eternal wars, experts worry about a delight the military faced after the Vietnam War: an exodus of exhausted troops, a rise in drug addiction and racism, and leaders who would arguably be so focused on strengthening the defense budget that they are not paying attention to the task of a new war. even as China threatens Taiwan, Russia threatens Ukraine, and the dwindling resources and landscapes caused by climate replacement are the army planners rushing to keep pace.
But Crane and other experts say that, if done right, time may be offering the possibility of taking a break: thinking about what battles would look like in the long run and thinking about how the military could move from scandal to spearhead as to how. it handles racism and sexism, and how it can inspire a new generation to join its ranks.
After the Vietnam War, there was great interest in integrating new weapons, such as the Abrams main war tank, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the Apache attack helicopter. Fulda Gap and taking control of West Germany, the leaders strove to exercise a professional officer corps, as well as to expand the national exercise centers needed to practice ground warfare. The counterinsurgency techniques developed in Vietnam were lost: small group tactics do not necessarily require giant civilian contracts, and were not mandatory during the Cold War and desert storm.
But at least five years after the Sept. 11 attacks and after the U. S. had already established itself in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon deemed counterinsurgency strategies necessary, and Gen. David Petraeus asked Crane to write a counterinsurgency manual, starting with his reports. in Vietnam, as well as in the then classified army combat in El Salvador.
“Our adversaries are constantly tracking what’s happening in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Crane said at the time. “They’re adapting and drawing ideas, and they’re going to make us fight this kind of other war. This manual is not a solution for Iraq or Afghanistan, however, it will prepare infantrymen and marines for the long term and the enemies we will face.
But the COIN manual was not successful at the point of business — or politics — in any meaningful way, and Crane’s organization necessarily had to pressure trained troops to “break things” to think about “winning hearts and minds. “The new presidents and generals incorporated more troops, trained the local army to fend for themselves, and even tried to negotiate with the original enemy, but then watched in disbelief as ISIS took control of Iraq’s hard-won regions and the Taliban won the game. of a fight.
After the Vietnam War, as well as in the first two years in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military learned tactical classes in counterinsurgency projects, says Gregory A. Daddis, retired U. S. Army colonelAnd director of the Center for War and Society at San Diego State University. But U. S. civilian leaders failed to recognize that no matter how many thousands of troops were deployed, how much cash was invested, or whether new four-star generals were ordained, they would not deliver on the stated project of equipping and educating Afghanistan. security forces that can save them independently of Taliban fighters from taking over the country.
“For the past few decades, we have been convinced that a new approach, a new strategy, a new commander would come and save the situation,” Daddis said, adding that this had no compatibility with the old record.
But it is: once again, discussions at the Pentagon focus on the festival of wonderful powers, reflecting what former Defense Secretary Robert Gates invented as “the next war. “The Institutional Marine Corps and the military have a tendency to plan for the next war, which is to be introspective about what went well when conflicts end, says Heidi Urben, a retired Army intelligence commander and Chamberlain Fellow at Howard University.
These trends, along with the likely eternal push for increased defense spending, may send the U. S. to the U. S. USA Toward a repeat of Cold War expectations when the Pentagon deploys the B-21 strategic bomber, the Triton unmanned surveillance aircraft, the soft amphibious warships and the hypersonic missiles. .
When there is no existential threat, political leaders will have to redouble their efforts to justify the billions spent on the defense system. Present China as a “stimulus threat,” “the only country that can pose a systemic challenge to the United States. “States in the sense of challenging us, economically, technologically, politically and militarily,” as Defense Secretary Lloyd J. said. Austin III.
“What he wants to come out of moments like this is a fairer discussion about matching political objectives to the capabilities of the military,” he said.
Critical thinking about the issues of preparedness, modernization and emerging threats will be essential, experts say, as the United States navigates the path ahead from Afghanistan.
Today, Fulda Gap is unlikely to provide a battlefield. To be sure, special forces will continue to use counterinsurgency strategies primarily around the world. Gifts make war more like a video game for the voting public. And the risk of cyberattacks will mean that the “blood and treasure” treasure component can touch on a non-public level, as each and every civilian may be in danger. Deep down, the risks of ancient stalking.
While the Pentagon still aims to modernize systems, integrate unmanned vehicles, and demonstrate interoperability with the militaries of allied nations, emerging threats have forced the Pentagon to pivot.
The United States is discovered in an ambiguous dance with China over the island country of Taiwan. Although there has never been an infallible security commitment to protect Taiwan on the occasion of a Chinese invasion, fashionable weapons continue to enter the country. The special forces released a video of the education of the Green Berets along the Taiwanese commandos.
At least 90,000 Russian troops piled up along the border with Ukraine and stoked unrest opposed to the pro-Western government. The United States has transferred anti-tank missiles and high-end patrol boats to the country, according to Reuters. maintained a state partnership program with the Ukrainian military that has shared expertise in border security, emergency response and civilian army since 1993.
The festival of wonderful powers is the only project in front of the army planners. Forces continue to fight ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria, Iraq, the Horn of Africa and other areas of confrontation.
Before sending U. S. forces into a new war, the U. S. government will have to realize that the U. S. will have to stay in this country for a long time, Crane says. they require a U. S. military presence more than 70 years later.
And he wonders if it’s more about expanding new technologies or new concepts to have interaction in wars.
“What are you preparing for?” crane said. ” The maximum probable project is probably some kind of stability operation, or the maximum harmful project – which is this large-scale war, which requires all kinds of fighting – and therefore it is a dilemma. “
Politically, more spending translates into more national security, as well as more cash for states than space defense manufacturers, there is an eternal cycle of lobbying and cross-contributions and contracts slipping into the annual budget.
“And clearly, as we have noticed the Cold War and today, there are political rewards for showing their commitment to national security,” Daddis said. “It is much safer politically to focus on China’s risk than to focus on climate change risk. “
The withdrawal from Afghanistan opens a window for the military and Marine Corps to invest in cyber warfare. But those forces might not be the linchpin of long-term conflicts.
“While I agree that this is a phenomenal opportunity to invest, I’m pessimistic about expecting large transfers of resources, for example, from brigade fighting groups to invest more in non-traditional roles you’re talking about, such as cyber,” Urben says. . .
While senior leaders make those decisions, the electorate has had little strain to replace the way things are done, which is largely due to the military/civilian divide. According to the Pew Research Center, less than 10% of the American adult population has served in the military, and because many other people are recruited from the same geographic and socioeconomic categories, many Americans do not have a circle of family members or neighbors serving.
“My own opinion of what’s happening [in] the military is that it’s a matter of a circle of relatives,” Crane says. “What you have is that more and more infantrymen are coming from the same places. Crucible was during the draft.
The country’s privileged young people have largely turned to prestigious universities and careers in the personal sector, and many families in this population see military service as a difficult undertaking better suited to someone else, Crane says.
This means that the American public is not at war and cannot bear the consequences of opting for conflict.
President Joe Biden remains one of the few political leaders with a boy who served in the military. Having more politicians with the same self-interest in a war can make the country think twice before attacking, Crane says.
But as with the end of the Vietnam War, scandals and fighting fatigue will likely have an effect on the army’s recruitment efforts, not only in number, but also in quality.
“The army was more than empty. Some parts were very rotten,” said Gen. Meigs, a former U. S. Army commander. USA In Europe, about the end of the Vietnam War. In 2001, Meigs wrote an article about the delight of his leadership on the grounds of the Army War College.
In 1972, the army led through the Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams, tried to rebuild and the service created a “rapid release program” that allowed commanders to break through the court-martial. addicts, gang members and other troublemakers, according to The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today, through Thomas E. Ricks.
But it wasn’t enough. Benefits and wages declined during the 1970s, and recruitment also declined, according to the Congressional Research Service. By the end of the decade, the army and army failed to meet their recruitment goals, and only a portion of the infantrymen had graduated from high school. more than 40% of the new infantrymen were fired before the end of their first enlistment, for bad behavior.
“The challenge that army chiefs had in the last 1970s to rebuild an army, and this was done in the context of the transition to a volunteer force,” Urben says. “It’s seismic, and we don’t have the same task ahead of us today. “
At that point, the military simply won’t raise the cash it needed to get its equipment running at full power, let alone fund fashionable weapons. Introspection has taken precedence over survival. Beyond the defeat, the Defense Ministry faced primary scandals that affected public perception: My Lai’s bloodbath sparked cries of “killers in the bathroom” as infantrymen returned home. In 1965, black infantrymen accounted for about 22% of all deaths in Vietnam, although they accounted for only 11% of the force, and although the age percentage dropped to around 13% in 1967, this eventually led black infantrymen to avoid infantry, as well as pursue a skill that would be marketable in the civilian world. And while black and white infantrymen served from aspect to aspect during the war, racism came to the fore when they returned home.
As they struggled, officials left in search of greater opportunities or didn’t order in the first place, according to the Congressional Research Service.
Today, scandals have once shaken the conversation:
The Pentagon has announced its goal of firing a corps of army workers who have pledged allegiance to extremist groups.
Some leaders have internalized the false sense that they can do their homework well or focus on managing the internal culture of their unit, but they can’t do both, Urben says. But much of the change, as well as introspection, will have to come from within.
“The concept that the constant rotation of consecutive implementations prevents us from receiving quality care to demanding systemic situations within our ranks. . . ,” urben says. “I hope this myth fades away. “
However, this pro-volunteer force may be the army’s saving grace, Daddis says, while many Afghanistan veterans were disappointed to see the country fall into the hands of the Taliban a few weeks after the departure of the last American boots, and indeed many see the desire for cultural change. possibly they would not be in a position to give up a career they have proposed. personal safety, circle of relatives and comfort.
In fact, despite the blow to morale, don’t expect an exodus, says Daddis.
“I don’t necessarily think they’ll see a brain drain, if so, after Afghanistan,” he says, “because there will be committed professionals in the organization who will need it to succeed, especially in the wake of what many see as a failed effort.
This War Horse article reported through Daniel Langhorne, edited through Kelly Kennedy, verified through Ben Kalin and edited through Mitchell Hansen-Dewar.
Daniel Langhorne is the engagement editor for The War Horse, which manages social media, newsletters and club development. He began his career as a journalist on the Orange County Register as an editor covering city government, the Nixon Presidential Library, housing, education and water. Since 2015, Daniel has covered military affairs and many other topics for Military. com, Law360, and the Los Angeles Times. Daniel earned his bachelor’s degree in English and Political Science from Chapman University.
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